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Abstract
We consider the problem of super-replication (hedging without risk)
for the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. The dual characterization of super-
replication cost is provided. It is shown that the reservation prices of
investors converge to this cost as their respective risk-aversion tends
to infinity.
Keywords: Arbitrage Pricing Theory, super-replication, large markets,
risk-neutral measures
JEL classification: D4; G1
1 Introduction
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was originally introduced by Ross ([28],
[29]) and later extended by [18], [9], [10] and numerous other authors. The
APT assumes an approximate factor model and states that the risky asset
returns in a “large” financial market are linearly dependent on a finite set
of random variables, termed factors, in a way that the residuals are uncor-
related with the factors and with each other.
The APT emphasizes the role of the covariance between asset returns and
those exogenous factors, while the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of
[30, 22] is based on the covariance between asset returns and the endogenous
market portfolio. One of the desirable aspects of the APT is that it can
be empirically tested as argued, for example, in [14]. These remarkable
conclusions had a huge bearing on empirical work, see [7], [4]. Papers on
the theoretical aspects of APT mainly focused on showing that the model is
a good approximation in a sequence of economies when there are “sufficiently
many” assets, see for example [9, 10, 18, 19, 28, 27, 1].
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Ross derives the APT pricing formula under the assumption of absence
of asymptotic arbitrage in the sense that a sequence of asymptotically cost-
less and riskless finite portfolios does not asymptotically yield a positive
return. Mathematical finance subsequently took up the idea of a market
involving a sequence of markets with an increasing number of assets in the
so-called theory of large financial markets (see, among other papers, [20, 21])
and mainly study the characterization of a notion of absence of arbitrage,
using sequence of portfolio involving finitely many assets where the classi-
cal notion of no arbitrage holds true i.e. non-negative portfolios with zero
cost should have zero return. For the sake of generality, continuous trading
was assumed in the overwhelming majority of related papers. But these
generalizations somehow overshadowed the highly original ideas suggested
in [28] where a one-step model was considered. They did not answer the
following natural questions either: In the APT is there a way to consider
strategies involving possibly all the infinitely many assets and to exclude ex-
act arbitrage rather than asymptotic one? A first answer was given in [2] in
a measure-theoretical setup. Then [26] proposes a straightforward concept
of portfolios using infinitely many assets which we will use in the present
paper, see Section 2 below. This notion leads to the existence of equivalent
risk-neutral probability measures (also called martingale measures or pricing
measures) which are equivalent probability measures under which the asset
returns has probability zero.
While questions of arbitrage for APT have been extensively studied,
other crucial topics – such as utility maximization or pricing – received little
attention though these are important questions in today’s markets where
there is a vast array of available assets. This is particularly conspicuous
in the credit market where bonds of various maturities and issuers indeed
constitute an entity that may be best viewed as a large financial market,
see [11]. Questions of pricing inevitably arise and current literature on APT
does not provide satisfactory answers. A standard problem is calculating the
superreplication cost of a claim G. It is the minimal amount needed for an
agent selling G in order to superreplicate G by trading in the market. This is
the hedging price with no risk and, to the best of our knowledge, it was first
introduced in [5] in the context of transaction costs. In complete markets
with finitely many assets the superreplication cost is just the cash flows
expectation computed under the unique martingale measure. But when
such markets are incomplete, there exists a so-called dual representation in
terms of supremum of those expectations computed under the different risk-
neutral probability measures. see e.g. [15]. Our first contribution is such
a representation theorem for APT under mild conditions, see Theorem 4.2
below.
We are also able to prove the existence of optimizers for utility functions
on the positive real axis, see Theorem 5.2. Such results are standard for
finitely many assets, see e.g. [15]. In the context of APT, the case of
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utility functions defined on the real line (i.e. admitting losses) has been
considered in [26]. Finally, we establish that, when risk aversion tends to
infinity, the utility indifference (or reservation) prices (see [17]) tend to the
superreplication price. This links in a nice way investors’ price calculations
to the preference-free cost of superhedging, see Theorem 6.2.
The model is presented in Section 2. Concepts of no arbitrage are dis-
cussed in Section 3. The dual characterization of superreplication prices in
given in Section 4, the utility maximization problem is treated in Section
5. Finally, the asymptotics of reservation prices in the high risk-aversion
regime is investigated in Section 6.
2 The large market model
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. We consider a one step economy which
contains a countable number of tradeable assets. The price of asset i ∈ N
is given by (Sit){t∈{0,1}}. The returns Ri, i ∈ N represent the profit (or
loss) created tomorrow from investing one dollar’s worth of asset i today,
i.e. Ri =
Si
1
Si
0
− 1. We briefly describe below our version of the Arbitrage
Pricing Model, identical to that of [20, 25, 26], which is a special case of the
model presented in [28, 18].
We assume that the assets’ returns are given by
R0 := r Ri := µi + β¯iεi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
Ri := µi +
m∑
j=1
βji εj + β¯iεi, i > m,
where the εi are random variables and r, µi, β
j
i , βi are constants. Asset 0
represents a riskless investment with a constant rate of return r ∈ R. For
simplicity, we set r = 0 i.e. S01 = S
0
0 from now on. The random variables
εi, i = 1, . . . ,m serve as factors which influence the return on all the assets
i ≥ 1 while εi, i > m are random sources particular to the individual assets
Ri, i > m.
Assumption 2.1 The εi are square-integrable, independent random vari-
ables satisfying
E(εi) = 0, E
(
ε2i
)
= 1, i ≥ 1.
Remark 2.2 If the ε = (εi)i≥1 fail to be independent then the market will not
display good pricing properties (namely, there may not exist a martingale
measure having a second moment, see Proposition 4 of [25]).
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We further assume β¯i 6= 0, i ≥ 1 and reparametrize the model by intro-
ducing
bi := −
µi
β¯i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
bi := −
µi
β¯i
+
m∑
j=1
µjβ
j
i
β¯j β¯i
, i > m
and set b = (bi)i≥1. Asset returns take then the following form
Ri = β¯i(εi − bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
Ri =
m∑
j=1
βji (εj − bj) + β¯i(εi − bi), i > m.
For some n ∈ N, a portfolio φ in the assets numbered 0, . . . , n is an
arbitrary sequence φi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n of real numbers satisfying
n∑
i=0
φiS
i
0 = x, (1)
where x is a given initial wealth. Such a portfolio will have value tomorrow
given by
V x,φn :=
n∑
i=0
φiS
i
1 =
(
x−
n∑
i=1
φiS
i
0
)
S01
S00
+
n∑
i=1
φiS
i
1
= x+
n∑
i=1
φiS
i
0Ri = x+
n∑
i=1
ψiRi,
using (1), r = 0 and where ψi = φiS
i
0 is the amount held at time 1 in
asset i. Using our parametrization one can easily rewrite that for some
(h1, . . . , hn) ∈ R
n
V x,φn = x+
n∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) =: V
x,h
n .
The value tomorrow that can be attained using finitely many assets is given
by
Jx := ∪n≥1
{
V x,hn , (h1, . . . , hn) ∈ R
n
}
.
As Jx fails to be closed in any reasonable sense, we consider strategies which
can use infinitely many assets. This is more desirable from an economical
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point of view, see for example [2]. We require that those strategies belong
to
ℓ2 :=
{
(hi)i≥1,
∞∑
i=1
h2i <∞
}
the family of square-summable sequences for integrability reasons. Recall
that ℓ2 is a Hilbert space with the norm ||h||ℓ2 :=
√∑∞
i=1 h
2
i . We denote
by Φ the function mapping ℓ2 to L
2(Ω,F , P ) := {X : Ω→ R, E|X|2 <∞}
(shortly denoted by L2(P ) from now on) – the space of square-integrale
random variables, which is again a Hilbert space with the norm ||X||L2 :=√
E(|X|2) – and which is defined by
Φ(h) :=
∞∑
i=1
hiεi.
First the infinite sum in Φ(h) has to be understood as the limit in L2(P )
of (
∑n
i=1 hiεi)n≥1, which are Cauchy sequences. Indeed, under Assumption
2.1, for m > n,
E
( m∑
i=1
hiεi −
n∑
i=1
hiεi
)2 = m∑
i=n+1
h2iE
(
ε2i
)
+ 2
∑
n+1≤i<j≤m
hihjE(εiεj)
=
m∑
i=n+1
h2i ≤
∞∑
i=n+1
h2i ,
which can be arbitrarily small for n large enough, since it is the tail sum of
a converging series. Actually, under Assumption 2.1, Φ is even an isometry
by the same computation :
||Φ(h)||2L2 =
∞∑
i=1
h2i = ‖h‖
2
ℓ2 . (2)
We would like to give sense (as an L2(P ) limit of a sequence of finite sums)
to the portfolio value
V x,h := x+
∞∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi). (3)
Using again the same kind of computation, for h ∈ ℓ2,
E
( m∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)−
n∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)
)2 = m∑
i=n+1
h2i +
m∑
i=n+1
h2i b
2
i . (4)
So without any assumption on b, one can not expect that the finite sums
(
∑n
i=1 hi(εi − bi))n≥1 converge in L
2(P ). Hence we stipulate the following
as well.
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Assumption 2.3 We have that b ∈ ℓ2.
Then (4) shows that (
∑n
i=1 hi(εi − bi))n≥1 is a Cauchy-sequence in L
2(P )
and the infinite sum in (3) can be understood as an L2(P ) limit of finite
sums. Notice furthermore that
E
( ∞∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)
)2 = ‖h‖2ℓ2 + ‖hb‖2ℓ2 ≤ (1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2)‖h‖2ℓ2 <∞. (5)
From now, we will use the notation
〈h, ε − b〉 :=
∞∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi).
Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3, the value tomorrow that can be attained
using infinitely many assets with a strategy in ℓ2 is thus given by
Kx := {V x,h, h ∈ ℓ2} = {x+ 〈h, ε − b〉, h ∈ ℓ2}.
3 No arbitrage in large markets
In Arbitrage Pricing Theory, the classical notion of arbitrage is the asymp-
totic arbitrage in the sense of Ross (1976) and Huberman (1982).
Definition 3.1 There is an asymptotic arbitrage if there exists a sequence
of strategies (h(n))n≥1, with h(n) = (h(n)i)1≤i≤n, such that V
x,h(n)
n satisfies
E(V x,h(n)) −→
n→+∞
∞ and Var(V x,h(n)) −→
n→+∞
0.
If there exists no such sequence, then we say that there is absence of asymp-
totic arbitrage (AAA).
We would like to understand the link between AAA and the classi-
cal definition of no arbitrage, which says roughly that if the value of a
portfolio at time 1 – with value at time zero equal to 0 – is non nega-
tive then it should be zero. The no-arbitrage condition on a “small mar-
ket” with N random sources (called AOA(N)) for some N ≥ 1 holds
true if P
(∑N
i=1 hi(εi − bi) ≥ 0
)
= 1 for (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ R
N implies that
h1 = . . . = hN = 0. We prove in Lemma 3.3 that under the following as-
sumption there is absence of arbitrage in any of the markets containing N
assets.
Assumption 3.2 For all i ≥ 1,
P (εi > bi) > 0 and P (εi < bi) > 0.
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Lemma 3.3 Under Assumption 2.1, Assumption 3.2 implies AOA(N) for
any N ≥ 1. Moreover, AOA(N) implies the so called quantitative no
arbitrage condition: There exists some αN ∈ (0, 1) such that for every
(h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ R
N satisfying
∑N
i=1 h
2
i = 1
P
(
N∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < −αN
)
> αN . (6)
Note that (6) implies that
P
(
N∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < 0
)
> 0. (7)
Proof. We first prove (7). Let (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ R
N satisfying
∑N
i=1 h
2
i = 1.
Let Bi = {hi(εi − bi) < 0} and IN = {i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, hi 6= 0}. Then
⋂
i∈IN
Bi ⊂
{
N∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < 0
}
.
As for i ∈ IN , P (Bi) ≥ min {P ({εi − bi < 0}) , P ({εi − bi > 0})} > 0 and
the (εi)i≥1 are independent, we get that
P
 ⋂
i∈IN
Bi
 = ∏
i∈IN
P (Bi) > 0
and (7) holds true. Since this implies that the return on every non-zero
portfolio is negative with positive probability, AOA(N) follows for every
N ≥ 1.
We now prove (6). Introduce the following set for n ≥ 1
An =
{
h ∈ RN :
N∑
i=1
h2i = 1, P
(
N∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < −
1
n
)
≤
1
n
}
.
Let n0 := inf{n ≥ 1, An = ∅}. Assume that n0 = ∞. For all n ≥ 1, we
thus get some h(n) ∈ RN with
∑N
i=1 hi(n)
2 = 1 and such that P (Bn) ≤
1
n ,
with Bn := {
∑N
i=1 hi(n)(εi− bi) < −1/n}. By passing to a sub-sequence we
can assume that h(n) tends to some h∗ ∈ RN with
∑N
i=1(h
∗
i )
2 = 1. Then
{
∑N
i=1 h
∗
i (εi − bi) < 0} ⊂ lim infnBn and Fatou’s Lemma implies that
P
(
N∑
i=1
h∗i (εi − bi) < 0
)
≤ lim inf
n
P (Bn) = 0.
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This implies that P
(∑N
i=1 h
∗
i (εi − bi) ≥ 0
)
= 1, which contradicts (7). Thus
n0 < ∞, we can set αN =
1
n0
and for every (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ R
N satisfying∑N
i=1 h
2
i = 1 (6) holds true. ✷
It is well-known that absence of arbitrage in markets with finitely many
assets is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent martingale measure,
see e.g. [13, 15]. In the present setting with infinitely many assets we need
to use a concept that is somewhat more technical. We say that EMM2
(equivalent martingale measure with density in L2) holds true if the set of
martingale measures having a finite moment of order 2 is not empty i.e.
M2 :=
{
Q ∼ P,
dQ
dP
∈ L2(P ), EQ(εi) = bi, ∀i ≥ 1
}
6= ∅.
Remark 3.4 If Q ∈ M2 and if Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 hold true then
EQ
(
V 0,h
)
= 0 for all h ∈ ℓ2. Indeed, (
∑n
i=1 hi(εi − bi))n≥1 converges in L
2
to V 0,h and for all n ≥ 1,
EQ
(
n∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)
)
=
n∑
i=1
hiEQ (εi − bi) = 0.
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get that∣∣∣∣∣EQ
(
n∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)
)
− EQ(V
0,h)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
E
(
dQ
dP
)2)1/2E( n∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)− V
0,h
)21/2 → 0,
as n → ∞. Thus EQ
(
V 0,h
)
= limn→∞EQ (
∑n
i=1 hi(εi − bi)) = 0, see also
Lemma 3.4 of Ra´sonyi (2016).
Unfortunately Assumptions 2.1, 2.3 and 3.2 are not sufficient to ensure
that EMM2 holds true (see Proposition 4 of [25]). So we also postulate the
following.
Assumption 3.5 We have that
sup
i≥1
E
[
|εi|
3
]
<∞.
In Corollary 1 of [25] it is showed that under Assumptions 2.1, 3.2 and
3.5,
AAA ⇐⇒ Assumption 2.3⇐⇒ EMM2. (8)
With this in hand, one can show that AAA implies the classical no arbitrage
condition stated with infinitely many assets.
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Lemma 3.6 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 3.2 and 3.5 holds true. Assume
that AAA holds true. Then, if for some h ∈ ℓ2 one has that 〈h, ε − b〉 ≥ 0
a.s. then 〈h, ε − b〉 = 0 a.s.
Proof. Under AAA, we have that both Assumption 2.3 and EMM2 holds
true (see (8)). Let h ∈ ℓ2. Then 〈h, ε − b〉 is well-defined. Assume that
〈h, ε− b〉 ≥ 0. Fix some Q ∈ M2, then EQ(〈h, ε− b〉) = 0 (see Remark 3.4).
Thus 〈h, ε − b〉 = 0 Q-a.s. and also P -a.s. since P and Q are equivalent. ✷
Lemma 3.7 Assume that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 hold true and that
supi≥1E|εi|
γ ≤ C1 < ∞ for some γ ≥ 2. Then there is a constant Cγ
such that, for all h ∈ ℓ2
E|〈h, ε − b〉|γ ≤ Cγ‖h‖
γ
ℓ2
(
1 + ‖b‖γℓ2
)
.
Remark 3.8 Note that if {|Xn|
γ , n ∈ N} is uniformly integrable then for
any β ≤ γ, {|Xn|
β , n ∈ N} is also uniformly integrable. Indeed, trivially
|Xn|
β ≤ |Xn|
γ + 1 and then
lim
N→∞
sup
n
E[|Xn|
β1{|Xn|β≥N}]
≤ lim
N→∞
sup
n
E[(|Xn|
γ + 1)1{|Xn|γ≥N−1}]
≤ lim
N→∞
sup
n
E[2|Xn|
γ1{|Xn|γ≥N−1}] = 0
by the definition of uniform integrability. Here the second inequality holds
since, for N ≥ 2 on the set {|Xn|
γ ≥ N − 1} one has 1 ≤ |Xn|
γ .
Thus, under Assumptions 2.1, 2.3 and 3.5, for any c > 0, {
(
V x,h
)2
, h ∈
ℓ2, ‖h‖ℓ2 ≤ c} and also {|V
x,h|, h ∈ ℓ2, ‖h‖ℓ2 ≤ c} are uniformly integrable.
Proof. Let h(n) := (h1, . . . , hn, 0, 0, . . .) and b(n) := (b1, . . . , bn, 0, 0, . . .),
n ≥ 1. The Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund and triangle inequalities imply for
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some C2 > 0 that
E|〈h(n), ε − b〉|γ = E
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)
∣∣∣∣∣
γ
≤ C2E
( n∑
i=1
h2i (εi − bi)
2
)γ/2 = C2
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
h2i (εi − bi)
2
∥∥∥∥∥
γ/2
Lγ/2
≤ C2
(
n∑
i=1
∥∥h2i (εi − bi)2∥∥Lγ/2
)γ/2
= C2
(
n∑
i=1
|hi|
2 ‖εi − bi‖
2
Lγ
)γ/2
≤ C2
(
n∑
i=1
|hi|
2 (‖εi‖Lγ + ‖bi‖Lγ )
2
)γ/2
≤ C22
γ/2
(
sup
i≥1
‖εi‖
2
Lγ
n∑
i=1
|hi|
2 +
n∑
i=1
|hi|
2|bi|
2
)γ/2
≤ C22
γ−1
(
sup
i≥1
E|εi|
γ‖h(n)‖γℓ2 + ‖h(n)‖
γ
ℓ2
‖b(n)‖γℓ2
)
≤ C22
γ−1‖h(n)‖γℓ2
(
C1 + ‖b(n)‖
γ
ℓ2
)
≤ Cγ‖h(n)‖
γ
ℓ2
(
1 + ‖b(n)‖γℓ2
)
and Fatou’s lemma finishes the proof. ✷
For all x ≥ 0, we introduce the set of attainable wealth at time 1, allowing
the possibility of throwing away money:
Cx := Kx − L+2 . (9)
Proposition 3.9 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true.
Fix some z ∈ R and let B ∈ L2(P ) such that B /∈ Cz. Then there exists
some η > 0 such that
inf
h∈ℓ2
P (z + 〈h, ε − b〉 < B − η) > η. (10)
Proof. Assume that (10) is not true. Then, for all n ≥ 1, there exists some
h(n) ∈ ℓ2 such that P (Vn < B −
1
n) ≤
1
n , where Vn := z + 〈h(n), ε − b〉. Set
κn :=
(
Vn − (B −
1
n)
)
1{Vn≥B− 1n}
. Then P (|Vn − κn − B| >
1
n) = P (Vn <
B − 1n) ≤
1
n and thus (Vn − κn)n≥1 converges to B in probability.
First we prove that supn ||h(n)||ℓ2 <∞. Indeed assume that supn ||h(n)||ℓ2 =
∞. By extracting a subsequence (which we continue to denote by n) we may
and will assume ||h(n)||ℓ2 → ∞, n → ∞. Define h˜i(n) := hi(n)/||h(n)||ℓ2
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for all n, i. Clearly, h˜(n) ∈ ℓ2 with ||h˜(n)||ℓ2 = 1 and V
0,h˜(n) − κn||h(n)||ℓ2
goes
to 0 in probability and also a.s. Now under Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and
3.5, there exists some equivalent martingale probability measure Q ∈ M2
(see (8)). If
EQ
(
V 0,h˜(n) −
κn
||h(n)||ℓ2
)
→ 0, (11)
as EQV
0,h˜(n) = 0 (see Remark 3.4) we deduce that κn||h(n)||ℓ2
goes to zero in
L1(Q) and also Q-a.s. (along a subsequence) and, as Q is equivalent to P ,
P -a.s. This implies that V 0,h˜(n) goes to 0 a.s. As the family |V 0,h˜(n)|2, n ≥ 1
for ‖h˜(n)‖ℓ2 ≤ 1 is uniformly integrable (see Assumption 3.5 and Remark
3.8), we get that V 0,h˜(n) → 0 in L2(P ) as well. But this is absurd since
using the isometry property (see (5)), we get that
‖V 0,h˜(n)‖2L2 = ‖h(n)‖
2
ℓ2 + ‖h(n)b‖
2
ℓ2 ≥ 1
for all n ≥ 1. This contradiction shows that necessarily supn ||h(n)||ℓ2 <∞.
Now we prove that (11) holds true. Since V 0,h˜(n) − κn||h(n)||ℓ2
goes to 0 P -a.s.
and by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,∣∣∣∣EQ(V 0,h˜(n) − κn||h(n)||ℓ2
)∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
E
(
dQ
dP
)2√
E
(
V 0,h˜(n) −
κn
||h(n)||ℓ2
)2
.
It remains to show the uniform integrability of
(
V 0,h˜(n) − κn||h(n)||ℓ2
)2
, n ∈ N
under P . Notice that∣∣∣∣V 0,h˜(n) − κn||h(n)||ℓ2
∣∣∣∣2 = |B − z − 1n |2||h(n)||2ℓ2 1{V 0,h˜(n)≥ B−z− 1n||h(n)||ℓ2 } + |V 0,h˜(n)|21{V 0,h˜(n)< B−z− 1n||h(n)||ℓ2 }
≤
|B|2 + |z|2 + 1
n2
||h(n)||2ℓ2
+ |V 0,h˜(n)|2 ≤ c|B|2 + |V 0,h˜(n)|2,
for n big enough, with some constant c. Since we know the uniform inte-
grability under P of |V 0,h˜(n)|2, n ∈ N and that B2 is also integrable, (11) is
proved.
We have concluded that supn ||h(n)||ℓ2 < ∞. Then the Banach-Saks Prop-
erty (recall that ℓ2 has the Banach-Saks Property), there exists a subse-
quence (nk)k≥1 and some h
∗ ∈ ℓ2 such that for ĥ(N) :=
1
N
∑N
k=1 h(nk)∥∥∥ĥ(N)− h∗∥∥∥2
ℓ2
→ 0, N →∞.
Hence, using (5),
E
((
V z,ĥ(N) − V z,h
∗
)2)
= E
(
〈ĥ(N)− h∗, ε− b〉2
)
≤ (1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2)‖ĥ(N)− h
∗‖2ℓ2
→ 0, N →∞.
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So V z,ĥ(N) → V z,h
∗
a.s. as well. Then
V z,ĥ(N) = z + 〈ĥ(N), ε − b〉 =
1
N
N∑
k=1
(z + 〈h(nk), ε − b〉) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
V z,h(nk)
and V z,ĥ(N) − 1N
∑N
k=1 κnk converges to B in probability and also a.s. for
a subsequence for which we keep the same notation. This implies that
1
N
∑N
k=1 κnk converges a.s. and thus B ∈ C
z, a contradiction. ✷
Corollary 3.10 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true
and fix some z ∈ R. Then Cz is closed in probability.
Proof. We prove that there is an equivalence between (i) Cz is closed in
probability and (ii) B ∈ L2(P ) \ Cz implies that there exists some η > 0
such that
inf
h∈ℓ2
P (z + 〈h, ε − b〉 < B − η) > η. (12)
Assume that Cz is closed in probability and let B ∈ L2 \Cz . If (12) does not
hold true, going through the first paragraph of the proof of Proposition 3.9,
one gets that B ∈ Cz and the contradiction is immediate. Conversely, assume
that Cz is not closed in probability. Then one can find some h(n) ∈ ℓ2 and
κn ∈ L
+
2 such that θn = z + 〈h(n), ε− b〉 − κn ∈ C
z converges in probability
to some θ∗ /∈ Cz. Then
inf
h∈ℓ2
P (z + 〈h, ε − b〉 < θ∗ − η) ≤ P (z + 〈h(n), ε − b〉 − κn < θ
∗ − η)→ 0,
which contradicts (12). So (i) and (ii) are equivalent. But Proposition 3.9
shows that (ii) holds true under Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5. We
conclude that (i) holds true: Cz is closed in probability. ✷
We now provide a quantitative version of the NA condition (see Assumption
3.2) in the spirit of (6).
Proposition 3.11 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true.
Then there exists some α > 0, such that for all h ∈ ℓ2 satisfying ‖h‖ℓ2 = 1
P (〈h, ε〉 < −α) > α.
Note that changing h by −h, we find that P (〈h, ε〉 > α) > α and thus
P (|〈h, ε〉| > α) = P (〈h, ε〉 < −α) + P (〈h, ε〉 > α) > 2α.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Assume that for n ≥ 1, there exists h(n)
with ‖h(n)‖ℓ2 = 1 and
P (< h(n), ε >< −
1
n
) ≤
1
n
.
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Using Ho¨lder’s inequality and the fact that {< h(n), ε >≥ − 1n} ⊂ {| <
h(n), ε > | ≤ 1n}, we get that
E(〈h(n), ε〉2) = E
(
〈h(n), ε〉21{〈h(n),ε〉<− 1
n
}
)
+ E
(
〈h(n), ε〉21{〈h(n),ε〉≥− 1
n
}
)
≤
(
E(〈h(n), ε〉2)
3
2
) 2
3
(
E
(
1{〈h(n),ε〉>− 1
n
}
)) 1
3
+
1
n2
≤
(
E|〈h(n), ε〉|3
) 2
3
(
1
n
) 1
3
+
1
n2
≤ C
2
3
3
(
1
n
) 1
3
+
1
n2
,
using Lemma 3.7. When n→∞, this contradicts (recall (2))
E(〈h(n), ε〉2) = ‖h(n)‖2ℓ2 = 1.
✷
The following lemma proves that under the NA condition (see Assumption
3.2) any admissible strategy is bounded.
Lemma 3.12 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true. Let
y ≥ 0 and h ∈ ℓ2 such that y+ < h, ε − b >≥ 0. Then there exists some αˆ
such that
‖h‖ℓ2 ≤
y
αˆ
.
Proof. Recall α > 0 from Proposition 3.11. As b ∈ ℓ2, there exists some
Mα ≥ 1 such that
(∑
i≥Mα
b2i
)1/2
≤ α/2. By the admissibility condition,
we get that a.s
y +
Mα−1∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) +
∑
i≥Mα
hi(εi − bi) ≥ 0. (13)
If all the hi are zero then there is nothing to prove. Assume that hi 6= 0 for
some i ∈ {1, . . . ,Mα − 1}. Let
A =
{
Mα−1∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < 0
}
and B =
y + ∑
i≥Mα
hi(εi − bi) ≤ 0
 .
From the no arbitrage condition in the market with Mα − 1 assets (see
Assumption 3.2 and (7) in Lemma 3.3) we get that P (A) > 0. Assume
that P (B) > 0. As the (εi)i≥1 are independent, we get that P (A ∩ B) =
P (A)P (B) > 0 which contradicts the admissibility of h (see (13)). Thus a.s.
y +
∑
i≥Mα
hi(εi − bi) ≥ 0. (14)
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Let hˆ = (0, . . . , 0, hMα , hMα+1, . . . , ) and bˆ = (0, . . . , 0, bMα , bMα+1, . . . , ).
Recall that ‖bˆ‖ℓ2 ≤ α/2. Proposition 3.11 implies that
P
(
〈
hˆ
‖hˆ‖ℓ2
, ε〉 < −α
)
> α.
Then on the set
{
〈 hˆ
‖hˆ‖ℓ2
, ε〉 < −α
}
, using (14), we get that
0 ≤ y + 〈hˆ, ε〉 − 〈hˆ, bˆ〉 ≤ y − α‖hˆ‖ℓ2 + ‖bˆ‖ℓ2‖hˆ‖ℓ2
≤ y − α‖hˆ‖ℓ2 +
α
2
‖hˆ‖ℓ2 = y −
α
2
‖hˆ‖ℓ2 .
Thus ‖hˆ‖ℓ2 ≤
2y
α .
Now take i ∈ {1, . . . ,Mα − 1} such that hi 6= 0 and let
C =
∑
i≥Mα
hi(εi − bi) ≤ 0
 and D =
{
y +
Mα−1∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < 0
}
.
We have that EQ(
∑
i≥Mα
hi(εi−bi)) = 0 (recall Remark 3.4). Thus Q(C) >
0. AsQ and P are equivalent, we get that P (C) > 0. Assume that P (D) > 0.
As the (εi)i≥1 are independent, we get that P (C ∩ D) = P (C)P (D) > 0
which contradicts the admissibility of h (see (13)). Thus a.s.
y +
Mα−1∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) ≥ 0. (15)
Let h¯ = (h1, . . . , hMα−1), ε¯ = (ε1, . . . , εMα−1) and b¯ = (b1, . . . , bMα−1). From
the AOA(Mα − 1) (see Assumption 3.2 and (6) in Lemma 3.3), there exists
some α¯ such that
P
(
〈
h¯
‖h¯‖ℓ2
, ε¯− b¯〉 < −α¯
)
> α¯.
Then on the set
{
〈 h¯
‖h¯‖ℓ2
, ε¯− b¯〉 < −α¯
}
, we get from (15) that
0 ≤ y + 〈h¯, ε¯− b¯〉 ≤ y − α¯‖h¯‖ℓ2 .
Thus ‖h¯‖ℓ2 ≤
y
α¯ and
‖h‖ℓ2 =
(
‖hˆ‖2ℓ2 + ‖h¯‖
2
ℓ2
) 1
2
≤
√
4y2
α2
+
y2
α¯2
=
y
αˆ
.
✷
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4 Superreplication price
Let G ∈ L0 be a random variable which will be interpreted as the payoff
of some derivative security at time T . The superreplication price is the
minimal initial wealth needed for hedging G without risk
π(G) := inf{z ∈ R : V z,h ≥ G for some h ∈ ℓ2}
where π(G) = +∞ is the set is empty. We refer to [15] for more information
about this preference-free price.
Lemma 4.1 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 holds true.
Then π(G) > −∞ and there exists h ∈ ℓ2 such that π(G) + 〈h, ε − b〉 ≥ G
a.s.
Proof. Assume that π(G) = −∞. Then for all n ≥ 1, there exists hn ∈ ℓ2
such that −n+ 〈hn, ε− b〉 ≥ G a.s. Thus, 〈hn, ε− b〉 ≥ G+ n ≥ (G+ n)∧ 1
a.s. It follows that (G+n)∧ 1 ∈ C0 (see (9)), which is closed in probability
(see Corollary 3.10). Thus 1 ∈ C0, i.e. 〈h, ε− b〉 ≥ 1 a.s., which contradicts
AAA (or Assumption 2.3), see Lemma 3.6. So π(G) > −∞.
If π(G) = +∞, the second claim is trivial. So we can assume that, π(G) is
finite. Then for all n ≥ 1, there exists hn ∈ ℓ2 such that π(G)+
1
n + 〈hn, ε−
b〉 ≥ G a.s. It follows that G − π(G) − 1n ∈ C
0 and thus as C0 is closed
G− π(G) ∈ C0, i.e. there exists h ∈ ℓ2 such that π(G) + 〈h, ε − b〉 ≥ G a.s.
✷
We are now in position to prove our duality result.
Theorem 4.2 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true and
let G ∈ L2(P ). Then
π(G) = sup
Q∈M2
EQ(G).
Proof. Let x be such that there exists h ∈ ℓ2 such that x + 〈h, ε − b〉 ≥ G
a.s. Fix Q ∈ M2 (which is non-empty by Corollary 1 of [25], see (8)). As
G ∈ L2(P ), EQ(G) is well-defined by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Using
Remark 3.4, EQ(x + 〈h, ε − b〉) = x. Thus x ≥ EQ(G) and as this holds
true for all Q ∈ M2 and for all x such that there exists h ∈ ℓ2 such that
x+ 〈h, ε − b〉 ≥ G a.s., it follows that π(G) ≥ supQ∈M2 EQ(G).
For the other inequality, it is enough to prove that G−supQ∈M2 EQ(G) ∈
C0. Indeed, this will imply that there exists h ∈ ℓ2 such that supQ∈M2 EQ(G)+
〈h, ε−b〉 ≥ G a.s. which shows, by definition of π(G), that supQ∈M2 EQ(G) ≥
π(G).
Assume this is not true. Then {G−supQ∈M2 EQ(G)}∩(C
0∩L2(P )) = ∅.
As C0 is closed in probability (see Corollary 3.10), we can apply the Hahn-
Banach theorem and there exists Z ∈ L2(P ) \ {0} and θ, γ ∈ R such that
E(ZX) ≤ γ < θ ≤ E(Z(G− sup
Q∈M2
EQ(G))),
15
for all X ∈ C0 ∩ L2(P ). As C0 ∩ L2(P ) is a cone, one can choose γ = 0.
As −1Z<0 ∈ −L
2(P ) ⊂ C0 ∩ L2(P ), E(−1Z<0Z) ≤ 0 and this implies that
P (Z ≥ 0) = 1.
Choose hi to be the infinite sequence which is zero everywhere except in
the ith coordinate: hi ∈ ℓ2. Then < ±h
i, ε− b >= ±(εi − bi) ∈ C
0 ∩L2(P ).
Thus E(Z(εi − bi)) = 0 for all i ≥ 1.
Define Q by dQdP =
Z
E(Z) . Then
dQ
dP ∈ L
2, EQ(εi − bi) = 0 for all i ≥ 1 and
EQ(G) > supQ∈M2 EQ(G).
Choose some Q˜ ∈ M2 and let η ∈ (0, 1). Set Qη = (1−η)Q+ηQ˜. It is clear
that Qη ∈ L
2 and that Qη ∼ P . It is also clear that EQη(εi − bi) = 0 for all
i ≥ 1 and Qη ∈ M
2 follows. Moreover, one can always find some η ∈ (0, 1),
such that EQη(G) > supQ∈M2 EQ(G). This contradiction completes the
proof. ✷
Remark 4.3 One may wonder whether πn(G) the superreplication price of
G in the small market with n random sources (εi)1≤i≤n converges to π(G)
the superreplication price of G in the large market. The answer is no in
general: If G needs to be hedge with all the (εi)i≥1, then πn(G) = +∞. Let
us sketch a concrete example: Let εi, i ∈ N be standard Gaussian, let bi = 0
for all i ∈ N and define G :=
∑∞
i=1 i
−1εi. There exists no x, h1, . . . , hn with
x+
n∑
j=1
hjεj ≥ G
since this would mean
n∑
j=1
(hj − j
−1)εj +
∑
j≥n+1
j−1εj ≥ −x
where the left-hand side is a Gaussian random variable with non-zero vari-
ance. It follows that πn(G) =∞ while π(G) = 0, trivially.
5 Utility maximisation
The idea of modeling preferences of agents by utility functions goes back
to [6]. This approach was revived after the appearance of [23] and led
to the axiomatic treatment [31]. We follow this traditional viewpoint and
model economic agents’ preferences by concave increasing utility functions
U , where concavity of U is related to risk aversion.
So let us suppose that U : (0,∞) → R is a concave strictly increasing
differentiable function. Note that we extend U to [0,∞) by (right)-continuity
(U(0) may be −∞). We also set U(x) = −∞ for x ∈ (−∞, 0). For a
contingent claim G ∈ L0 and x ∈ R, we define
Φ(U,G, x) :=
{
h ∈ ℓ2, EU
+(V x,h −G) < +∞
}
.
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We also introduce the set of strategies which dominate G a.s. starting from
a given wealth x ∈ R
A(G,x) :=
{
h ∈ ℓ2, V
x,h ≥ G a.s.
}
.
Finally, we set
A(U,G, x) := Φ(U,G, x) ∩ A(G,x).
Note that even for x ≥ π(G), A(U,G, x) might be empty. Indeed, from
Lemma 4.1, we know that there exists some h ∈ A(G,x), but h might not
belong to Φ(U,G, x). But this holds true under appropriate assumptions, as
proved in the lemma below.
Lemma 5.1 Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true. Assume that
G ≥ 0 a.s. and U(x0) = 0, U
′(x0) = 1, for some x0 ≥ 0. Then A(G,x) =
A(U,G, x) for all x ∈ R.
Proof. As U is increasing, concave and differentiable with U(x0) = 0 and
U ′(x0) = 1, for all x ∈ R,
U(x) ≤ U(max(x0, x)) ≤ U(x0) + max(x− x0, 0)U
′(x0)
≤ max(x− x0, 0) ≤ |x− x0| ≤ |x|,
since x0 ≥ 0. If x < π(G) then A(G,x) = ∅ and A(G,x) = A(U,G, x) = ∅.
Let x ≥ π(G). Then by Lemma 4.1, A(G,x) 6= ∅. Let h ∈ A(G,x). Then
V x,h ≥ G ≥ 0 a.s. and h ∈ A(0, x). Hence, we get that
U+(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉 −G) ≤ U+(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉)
≤ U+(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉)1{x+〈h,ε−b〉≥x0} + U
+(x0)1{x+〈h,ε−b〉<x0}
= U(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉)1{x+〈h,ε−b〉≥x0}
≤ x+ < h, ε− b >, (16)
since h ∈ A(0, x). Using (5), we get that
E〈h, ε − b〉2 ≤ ‖h‖2ℓ2(1 + ‖b‖
2
ℓ2).
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 3.12 imply that
EU+(x+ 〈h, ε− b〉 −G) ≤ x+
√
E (〈h, ε − b〉2)
≤ x+ ‖h‖ℓ2
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2
≤ x+
x
αˆ
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2 < +∞. (17)
✷
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We now define the supremum of the expected utility at the terminal date
when delivering claim G, starting from initial wealth x ∈ R :
u(G,x) := sup
h∈A(U,G,x)
EU(V x,h −G),
where u(G,x) = −∞ if A(U,G, x) = ∅. The following result establishes that
there exists an optimal investment for the investor we are considering.
Theorem 5.2 Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 hold true. Let G ≥ 0
and x ∈ [π(G),∞). There exists h∗ ∈ A(U,G, x) such that
u(G,x) = EU(V x,h
∗
−G).
Proof. If U is constant there is nothing to prove. Else there exists x0 > 0
such that U ′(x0) > 0. Replacing U by by
U
U ′(x0)
− U(x0)U ′(x0) , we may and
will suppose that U(x0) = 0 and U
′(x0) = 1. Let x ≥ π(G) and let hn ∈
A(G,x) = A(U,G, x) (see Lemmata 4.1 and 5.1) be a sequence such that
EU(V x,hn −G) ↑ u(G,x), n→∞.
By Lemma 3.12,
sup
n∈N
‖hn‖ℓ2 ≤
x
αˆ
<∞.
Hence as ℓ2 has the Banach-Saks Property, there exists a subsequence (nk)k≥1
and some h∗ ∈ ℓ2 such that for h˜n :=
1
n
∑n
k=1 hnk
‖h˜n − h
∗‖ℓ2 → 0, n→∞
for some h∗ ∈ ℓ2. Note that supn∈N ‖h˜n‖ℓ2 ≤
x
αˆ <∞. Using (5), we get that
E〈h˜n − h
∗, ε− b〉2 ≤ ‖h˜n − h
∗‖2ℓ2(1 + ‖b‖
2
ℓ2)→ 0,
when n → ∞. In particular, 〈h˜n − h
∗, ε − b〉 → 0, n → ∞ in probability.
Hence also U(V x,h˜n−G)→ U(V x,h
∗
−G) in probability by continuity (right
continuity in 0) of U on [0,∞). We claim that the family U+(V x,h˜n − G),
n ∈ N is uniformly integrable. Indeed using (16), we have that
U+(V x,h˜n −G) ≤ x+ 〈h˜n, ε− b〉.
Thus, from Assumption 3.5 and Remark 3.8, we get that {U+(V x,h˜n −
G), hn ∈ ℓ2, ‖hn‖ℓ2 ≤
x
αˆ} is uniformly integrable and thus
lim
n→∞
E
(
U+(V x,h˜n −G)
)
= E
(
U+(V x,h
∗
−G)
)
.
18
Fatou’s lemma used for −U− implies that
E
(
−U−(V x,h
∗
−G)
)
≥ lim sup
n→∞
E
(
−U−(V x,h˜n −G)
)
,
By concavity of U ,
U(V x,h˜n −G) = U
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
(V x,hnk −G)
)
≥
1
n
n∑
k=1
U
(
V x,hnk −G
)
and we get that
EU(V x,h
∗
−G) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
EU(V x,h˜n −G) ≥ u(G,x),
and the proof is finished. ✷
6 Convergence of reservation price to the super-
replication price
We go on incorporating a sequence of agents in our model. A measure of
risk aversion have been introduced by [3] and [24] with the “absolute risk-
aversion” functions rn defined by rn(x) := −
U ′′n (x)
U ′n(x)
. Pratt in [24] shows
that an investor n has greater absolute risk-aversion than investor m (i.e.
rn(x) > rm(x) for all x) if and only if investor n is globally more risk averse
than m, in the sense that the cash equivalent of every risk (the amount of
cash for which he would exchange the risk) is smaller for n than for m.
Keeping these preliminary considerations in mind, Assumption 6.1 below
says that the sequence of agents we consider have asymptotically infinite
aversion towards risk.
Assumption 6.1 Suppose that Un : (0,∞) → R, n ∈ N is a sequence of
concave strictly increasing twice continuously differentiable functions such
that
∀x ∈ (0,∞) rn(x) := −
U ′′n(x)
U ′n(x)
→∞, n→∞.
Note that we extend each Un to [0,∞) by (right)-continuity (Un(0) may be
−∞). We also set Un(x) = −∞ for x ∈ (−∞, 0).
We introduce the value functions for our sequence of utility functions
(Un)n≥1. For x ∈ R we define
un(G,x) := sup
h∈A(Un,G,x)
EUn(V
x,h −G)
where un(G,x) = −∞ if A(Un, G, x) = ∅. The utility indifference (or reser-
vation) price pn(G,x), introduced by [17], is defined as
pn(G,x) = inf{z ∈ R : un(G,x+ z) ≥ un(0, x)}.
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Intuitively, it seems reasonable that under Assumption 6.1 the utility
prices pn(G,x) tend to π(G). This is proved below under a suitable set of
assumptions, relying on the results of Sections 4 and 5.
Theorem 6.2 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, 3.2 and 3.5 holds true.
Suppose that x > 0 and G ∈ L0+. Then the utility indifference prices
pn(G,x) are well-defined and converge to π(G) as n→∞.
Proof. Fix some x > 0. Notice that Assumption 6.1 remains true if we
replace each Un by αnUn + βn for some αn > 0, βn ∈ R. Also, the utility
indifference prices defined by these new functions are the same as the ones
defined by the original Un. Hence by choosing αn := 1/U
′
n(x) and βn :=
−Un(x)/U
′
n(x), we may and will suppose that for all n ∈ N, Un(x) = 0, and
U ′n(x) = 1.
If π(G) = +∞. By definition for all z ∈ R, n ≥ 1, ∅ = A(G, z) =
A(Un, G, z) and un(G,x + z) = −∞. But un(0, x) ≥ EUn(x) = 0. Thus
pn(G,x) = +∞ for all n ≥ 1 and the claim is proved.
Assume now that π(G) <∞. First remark that
pn(G,x) ≤ π(G). (18)
Indeed, we may take a strategy hˆ ∈ A(G,π(G)) (which is non-empty, see
Lemma 4.1). Then V π(G),hˆ ≥ G a.s. and as Un is non-decreasing,
un(0, x) ≤ sup
h∈A(Un,0,x)
EUn(V
x+π(G),h+hˆ −G)
≤ sup
h∈A(Un,G,x+π(G))
EUn(V
x+π(G),h −G) = un(G,x + π(G)),
where the second inequality follows for the fact that if h ∈ A(Un, 0, x) ⊂
A(0, x) then h+ hˆ ∈ A(G,x+π(G)) = A(Un, G, x+π(G)) (see Lemma 5.1).
So by definition of the utility indifference price (18) follows and we have that
pn(G,x) ≤ π(G) <∞ for all n ≥ 1. Thus, to prove that limn→∞ pn(G,x) =
π(G) it is enough to show that lim infn pn(G,x) ≥ π(G). Assume that this
is not the case. Hence we can find a subsequence (nk)k≥1 and some η > 0
such that pnk(G,x) ≤ π(G)− η for all k ≥ 1. We may and will assume that
x ≥ η. By definition of pnk(G,x) we have that
unk(G,x+ π(G)− η) ≥ unk(0, x).
Assume that limk→+∞ unk(G,x+ π(G) − η) = −∞ is proved. Then
lim inf
k→+∞
unk(0, x) = −∞.
But
lim inf
k→+∞
unk(0, x) ≥ lim inf
k→+∞
EUnk(x) = 0,
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a contradiction.
It remains to prove that limk→+∞ unk(G, y) = −∞ with y = x+π(G)−
η < x+ π(G). For ease of notation, we will prove that limn→+∞ un(G, y) =
−∞.
First we show that x + G /∈ Cy. Indeed if this is not the case, there exists
some X ∈ L0+ and h ∈ ℓ2 such that x+G = V
y,h−X a.s., hence G ≤ V y−x,hT
a.s. Therefore we must have y − x ≥ π(G): A contradiction.
Applying Proposition 3.9, we get some γ > 0 such that infh∈ℓ2 P (Ah) >
γ, where
Ah := {y + 〈h, ε − b〉 < x+G− γ}.
Note that we can always assume that x ≥ γ. As y ≥ π(G), Lemma 4.1
implies that A(Un, G, y) 6= ∅. Hence for all h ∈ A(Un, G, y), we get that
EUn(y + 〈h, ε − b〉 −G) ≤ E1AhUn(x− γ) + E1Ω\AhU
+
n (y + h〈ε− b〉)
≤ γUn(x− γ) + EU
+
n (y + 〈h, ε − b〉). (19)
Here we used the fact that Un(x− γ) ≤ Un(x) = 0. Using (17), we get that
EU+n (y + 〈h, ε − b〉) ≤ y +
y
αˆ
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2 .
Thus,
un(G, y) ≤ γUn(x− γ) + y +
y
αˆ
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2 → −∞, (20)
when n goes to infinity, by Lemma 4 of [8]. ✷
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